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INTRODUCTION: ALEXANDER BROWN'S RETHEORIZING ACTION4BLE

1.

INJURIES AND THE VALUE OF PRECISION

"Define your terms!"
Who among uS has not had a teacher scold us for failure to do just that?
But what did she mean by "define?"' And what did she mean by "terms?"
Surely not every word in our paper, but which ones?2 Or perhaps we had a
debate coach who taught us to use this strategy against an opponent to watch
him struggle to come up with a definition while we gathered our thoughts and
prepared our next line of attack.- The demand to define one's terms, then, can
serve as a useful temporizing strategy for when we think we are probably not
going to like what the other person is planning to say. It slows him down. It
makes us look rigorous. And it gives us time to think and frame an answer.'
Other times, however, it can be an entirely legitimate task.5 With
deductive argument, for example, one is engaged in trying to find out what is
entailed in a term or proposition.' If you plan to do a lot of work with prime
numbers, it's a good idea to start by making sure that you, and any other
members of your team, have a clear idea of what a prime number is. 7
With legal terms, the situation tends to fall somewhere in between these
two extremes: the demand for a specific definition is sometimes in order, and
Should one include, in addition to some synonyms and a dictionary-type
1.
explication of the meaning, some examples? Set out the etymology of the term and
how it developed over time, its original meanings, and so forth? Any divergence
between its popular understanding and any technical application'? See. e.g., Oxfwd
English Dictionar, Online (defining the term -definition").

2. Just the main ones, one might think. But which ones are "main?" What
does "main" mean'? That way lies an infinite regress in which one can easily get lost
in a forest of words with no exit in sight.
3. See, e.g., Jeffrey Feldman, Framing the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (April 7,
2008) (noting the advisability of defining one's terms): TIM SONNREICH, GUIDE TO
DEBATING 8 (2010), http://www.imonashdebaters.com/downloads/Schools%`/`20
Training 0 20Guide.pdf.
4.
SONNREICH, supr'a note 3 (noting that providing definitions can be an
important preliminary step in any encounter).
5. Le, not a tactical ploy at all.
6.

Deductive, Inductive, and Abductive Reasoning, BUTTE COLLEGE,

http://www.butte.edu/departments/cas/tipsheets/thinking/reasoning.html.
7.
See, e.g., BERTRAND RUSSELL, WISDOM OF THE WEST 238-39 (1959)
(discussing analytical mode of argument in which one reasons from given or "a
priori" premises, as in mathematics or formal logic, to a conclusion and
distinguishing this approach from the scientific method, which seeks empirical truth
fi-om observation and experience).

2018]

Value of Precision: Comment on Brown's Retheorization

171

sometimes not. For example, when legislation is concerned, experienced
drafters know to provide definitions for any new or unfamiliar terms,
particularly if they are key to a new law one is hoping to enact. For example,
when drafting a rule regulating the amount of exhaust a diesel truck can emit,
one had better provide a definition of what he or she means by a diesel engine,
as well as by a truck. 8 The reason lies in common sense: not every highway
patrol officer, PUC official, or state licensing officer is likely to know what
such an engine is and how to tell one from an ordinary gasoline engine on
quick inspection. Much less are they likely to know how to tell whether a
large vehicle is what you mean be a "truck."
With criminal statutes, precision is even more necessary than it is with
industrial regulations, because more rides on it, including liberty.9 Thus, one
should not pass a new law criminalizing selling harmful inhalants to juveniles
without specifying what you mean by an inhalant and who you consider to
be a child.
With private law, especially torts, things are a little different. Here, it is
customary to define concepts in general terms, even important ones like
negligence ("what a reasonably prudent man would do in that situation")'( or
assault (putting another person in reasonable fear of an offensive touching).
And no one really minds because we are content to let a jury make decisions
inder a judge's instructions and rely on them to do their best.
Earlier, the judge may have had to make rulings, for example, on a
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, some of which may turn on a
definition of a legal term like the abovementioned two.' 2 But any such ruling

will come informed by centuries of case law that have found particular acts
negligent or to constitute an assault. Is it a case of assault if an obnoxious
individual knocks the hat off another person's head in a fit of pique'?13 Is it

8. Especially the latter: Is a large delivery van a truck'? A tractor trailer? A
large tow rig'?
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1982) (describing the broad range of interests protected by the Due Process Clause).
10. See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REV. 40, 41 (1915)
("[N]egligence is doing what a reasonable and prudent man would not have done or
not doing what such a man would have done."); W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
11. KEATON ET AL., supra note 10, § 10, at 43.
12. To wit, negligence or defamation.
13.

See WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,

(4th ed. 1971).

§ 20, at 36
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defamation if you call a lawyer a shyster?' 4 IS it a case of consumer fraud if
a merchant advertises used cars for sale with a full warranty, but it turns out
that the warranty, in small print, only covers the engine and drive shaft?15 In
none of these cases do we expect the judge or juror to proceed inductively,
deriving a decision from premises in the same manner in which a
mathematician computes the area of an irregular polygon with sides of known
lengths. As Wittgenstein said, the meaning is the use.
Administrative rules occupy a middle ground between torts and
legislative enactments. They require a degree of precision, thus counseling
definitions whenever possible.1 7 But life or death generally does not ride on
them, so that the degree of precision necessary for, say, a campus
administrative rule-don't plagiarize your term paper, return library books
on time or pay a fine is less than that which we require for a criminal statute
but somewhat higher than that which we insist upon in connection with most
civil torts.1 8
All these generalizations are commonsensical and are subject to some
exceptions and the ubiquitous sliding scale.
Which brings us to the subject of this Comment: how helpful is it to
define very carefully, as Alexander Brown has done, a tort action for racist
14. Jack F. Kuhlman, Libel and Libel Per Se, 45 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 24, 2529, 32 & n.n.43-44 (1966).
15. See Kenneth Chapman & Michael J. Meurer, Efficient Remedies fin'
Breach of Warrantv Cases, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109(1987).
16. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS sec. 43
(1953) (equating the meaning of a word with its use in language), STANLEY FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES
(1982) (showing how communities of meaning determine how we assign
significance to words and sentences). In legal discourse, a judge consults precedent
(the most nearly analogous case) aided by her informed intuitions about justice and

fair play.
17. See
What
Must
Be
Adopted Pursuant to the APA,
at
https://www.oal.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/05/WhatIs_a_Regulati
on.pdf (explaining procedure for determining meaning and intention of a measure
and using the example of one requiring adequate space between hospital beds) (last

visited Oct. 21, 2017).
18. In the law of torts, we feel comfortable defining terms like negligence
broadly and in general language. See supra text and accompanying notes 8-15. But
with university regulation, we know that we had better provide at least basic
guidance for terms like "adjunct professor," "full course load," and "within the
course of duties." A third category, not considered here, is the growing body of
hostile-workplace decisions that find employment discrimination when a worker is
subjected to harassing or racist language on the job. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
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hate speech?1 9 As the reader will see, our answer is "somewhat" and that the
reason for this has to do with countervailing policies that rise up and weigh,
consciously or unconsciously, formally or informally, on paper or in our
minds, against recognizing such a tort or giving it a wide scope.
The forms of resistance we have in mind are those emanating from the
idea that punishing racist speech 2 0 collides with the idea that speech generally

should be free. 21 Thus, if one of us feels like insulting, castigating,
upbraiding, or administering a tongue-lashing to you, a white reader, a Jewish
reader, or a reader of minority race or sexual orientation, we should be free
to do so. 2 2 Unless we really overdo it, overstep our authority,2 3 or make you
really, really mad, scared, or downcast.2 And especially if a lot of other
people are doing it, too, 25 or you are a captive audience. 2 6 And even more so
if one of us is your superior at work or in the classroom. 2 7
Since weighing free-speech concerns against those of a victim of hate
speech requires a degree of care, one can only admire Alexander Brown's
guidance through the thickets we encounter both in general and in particular

19. See Alexander Brown, Retheorizing Actionable Injuries in Civil Lawsuits
Involving Targeted Hate Speech: Hate Speech as Degradationand Humiliation, 9
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 1, 2 (2018) (noting that "My focus in this article is on how
civil lawsuits might provide legal redress for . . targeted hate speech ... an opaque
idiom with multiple meanings covering a heterogeneous collection of expressive
phenomena.")
20. More accurately, deeming it actionable.
21. Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracisin Rules: ConstitutionalNarratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 345 (1991).
22. E.g., Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words that
Wound, " 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 585 (1983) (arguing that speech, especially on
college campuses, should be as free as possible); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal? 1990 DUKE L. J. 484, 540-41 (same). See
also Brown, supra note 19, at 51 (noting this countervailing value). See also
Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 21, at 345.
23. Brown, supranote 19, at 32-34, 39-40, 48 (mentioning abuse of authority
as a component of the harm).
24. Id. at 32-34 (mentioning abuse of authority as a component of the offense
and discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress and "psychological
impact").
25. See Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 21, at 383-86
(discussing concerted action).
26. Brown, supra note 19, at 48.
27. Id. at 32-34.
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cases. 2 Brown shows convincingly how protecting against o/pense is less
29
important than protecting against degradation.
Humiliation, by contrast is
socially and psychologically reprehensible and generally calls for redress. 30
Ill-naturedsarcasm ("you lazy lout, what's wrong with you") ordinarily does
not.3 1 In the course of his long, carefully crafted paper, there emerge the
contours of a well drafted tort for racist, sexist, or religious hate speech.
Even more helpful is his discussion of the nature of the harms that can
accompany hate speech,
including silencing, 2 shock,3 3 feeling
dehumanized, 3 4 internalized anger,3

"complex dysphoria,"3

and loss of self-

7

esteem. Brown's careful consideration of these harms reminds readers,
including administrators, judges, jurors, and others, of what can be at stake
in these cases .3 Brown also reviews some of the physical reactions to hate
speech, especially for one who is helpless to retort, including increased blood
pressure, blushing, trembling,`9 headaches, loss of sleep, and inability to go
about daily tasks.4 ()Getting clear on the nature of the harm, in turn, helps with
defining the actions he wishes to delineate. If the harm is minimal or is noncompensable for some reason, there is little point in including the behavior
within one's definition of hate speech 41
The remainder of this Comment proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the
case law and scholarship having to do with hate speech, concentrating on
28. Id. at 3 (emphasizing the need to be clear on the "precise way in which
dignity is infringed or impaired."). See also id. at 15 passim (Part 11. Human
Dignity).
29.

See id. at 7 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) noting that the tort

does not cover petty indignities).
30.

Id.

(noting

that the author will concentrate

on humiliation

and

degradation).
3 1. Id. (noting that the tort system does not provide recompense for petty
insults or annoyances).
32. Id. at 34 (noting that some victims will silently walk away).
33. Id. at 28 (like being hit by "a bolt of lightning").
34. Id. at 29-30.
35. Id. at 34-35.
36.

Id. at 37-38.

37. Id. at 18 (noting that a core feature of dignity is a feeling of self-worth and
that injury to this feeling often accompanies hate speech).
38. See id. at 6 (noting that courts have adopted overly soft or imprecise
standards for reviewing hate speech cases with the result that they "are at risk of
summarily discounting the injuries caused by (it)").
39. Id. at 36 (noting these among other "physiological reactions").
40. Id. at 40.
41. As they say, de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with
trifles).
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redress through tort actions and university regulation. Many foreign legal
regimes deem hate speech a crime. 4 2 But the United States seems far from
adopting such an approach, so we limit this section to torts and university
conduct codes.
Part II proposes an approach to balancing the two main policiesminority protection and free speech-at play in these cases. They very often
come into conflict protecting the minority person means punishing the hate
speaker; and, conversely, permitting the hate speaker to say whatever is on
her mind comes at the expense of his or her victim. We urge that
policymakers strike the balance with a view to the times and society's needs,
in a manner that we explain and defend. 4 We then consider our own times
and conclude, in Part 111, that they urge a somewhat more minority-protective
approach than that called for during other periods, and explain why this is
so.44

II.

HATE SPEECH LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP

Professor Brown himself discusses the history of hate-speech law and
regulations, although this history appears dispersed throughout his paper. 4
We therefore provide for the reader interested in the subject a brief synopsis,
beginning with the early case law and literature and focusing on the two
areas-torts and campus regulation-mentioned above. 46 As will be seen,
both judges and legal writers 47 are sharply divided about what should be
done. Indeed, we recently addressed this divide between the two camps and
the reasons why it persists. 4 8 Part II offers a way out of the impasse by

weighing the competing considerations in light of changing social needs.

42.

See, e.g., Regina v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 (1990) (Canadian case where

a high school teacher was prosecuted for racist statements against the Jewish
community).
43. See infia Section 1. A.
44. See infra Section 1. B.

45.

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at 6-12, 15-20, 22-25, 38-39, 42-44.

46.
47.
48.

See supra text and accompanying notes 7-11.
To wit, scholarship and case law.
See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Four Ironies of Campus Climate,

101 MINN. L. REv. 1919, 1922-1932 (2017).
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A. Tort Law and Scholarship About Hate Speech: A Brief History
Upon noticing that the emerging case law having to do with racial insults
and invective was sharply divided, Richard Delgado wrote the first law
review article specifically addressing this subject." Published in 1987 in the
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, his article reviewed the
early cases, including Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, 5 Collins v. Smith
(City of Skokie), 5 1 and Beauharnaisv. Illinois.52 He reviewed the harms of

hate speech, 3 discussed the values at stake,S4 examined the extent to which
current case law was already protecting minority victims,5 5 and proposed a
new, freestanding civil remedy for racial castigation.so
A few years later, Charles Lawrence and Mari Matsuda addressed the
same subject, adding to Delgado's analysis. 7 Lawrence posited that much of
racism is unconscious and that racists rarely intend to injure their victims.
He analyzed how cultural exposure inclines most of us to devalue members
of groups other than our own " and concluded that formal rules and reminders
are useful means of decreasing the burden of racism that minorities suffer.0
Matsuda provided a number of new reasons calling for a hate-speech remedy,
including that sympathetic readers consider how that form of utterance
sounds to the victim, that is, when viewed "from the bottom."'" She posited
that if the average person were to consider the appropriate response to hate
49.

Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,

Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 133 (1982).
50. Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, 88 Wash.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977)
(en banc).
51. Collins v. Smith (City of Skokie), 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978).
52. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 250 (1952).
53. Delgado, supra note 49, at 135-49.
54. Id. at 140-41, 173-74.
55. Id. at 149-65.
56. Id. at 179-81.
57. Charles Lawrence, The Ego, the Id, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 317-388: Mari Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2320-2381 (1989).
58. Lawrence, supra note 57, at 324, 330-44.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 356-81 (putting forward a cultural-meaning test for racism). See also
Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE L. J. 431, 475-76 (expressly addressing campus hate speech).
61. Matsuda, supra note 57, at 2322, 2359-61, 2371-72. When viewed from
this perspective, hate speech causes real, undeniable harm, id. at 2340.
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speech from the perspective of John Rawls' veil of ignorance, they would
condemn it.6 2 Going further than Delgado and Lawrence, she suggested that
the American legal system consider making hate speech a crime.1 3 A few
years later, these three authors, together with Kimberl6 Crenshaw, published
Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First
Amendment, 64 which contained a lengthy introduction reviewing critical race
theory, showed how hate speech law figured into that body of scholarship, 5
and discussed the need for legal protection from racist hate speech. 6
Crenshaw contributed a chapter devoted to a controversy that arose when a
rap group, Two Live Crew, performed a song that appeared to demean
women.

B. Campus Hate Speech Codes-Case Law and Legal Scholarship
The discussion of hate speech soon broadened to include college and
university hate speech codes, 6 8 which sought to protect the same interest but
did so through campus conduct rules. The above authors and others weighed
in support of such measures," while First Amendment absolutists such as
Nadine Strossen and Donald Lively offered countervailing arguments. 70
Across the country, many colleges and universities enacted hate speech
codes, 7 ' a number of which came in for judicial review.

62.
63.

Id. at 2322-24, 2371-72.
E.g., id. at 2321-22.

64.

Mari Matsuda et al., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,

ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1-15.
Id. at 17-25.
Id. at 111-32.
See Delgado, supra note 22, at 343-87.
See, e.g., Lawrence, Hollers, supra note 57; Delgado, supra note 21. See

also Brown, supra note 19, at 6.
70.

Strossen, supra note 22; Richard Delgado, The Neoconservative Case

Against Hate-Speech Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the
Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1807-25 (1994) (discussing Donald
Lively and others who write in the same vein).
71.

JON B. GOULD,

REGULATION (2005).

SPEAK No EVIL:

THE TRIUMPH OF HATE-SPEECH
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For example, in UWM Post v. Regents, Univ'ersitV of Wisconsin,72 a
federal district court considered a hate speech rule that had been enacted by
the university system of Wisconsin. 73 Reasoning that the university's rule did
not meet the requirement of "fighting words"-74 since it did not require a

violent reaction-and was overly broad and vague,7 the judge struck down
the rule as a violation of the First Amendment. 7" A short time later, a federal
district court in Michigan reached the same conclusion in a case challenging
that university's student conduct code punishing hate speech. A third,
highly publicized but unpublished opinion arising from a student conduct
code at Stanford University reached the same result, leaving advocates of
restraints reeling. 7

At about this point Jon B. Gould, a law professor at

George Mason University, wrote a book entitled Speak No Evil: The Triumph
ofHate-Speech Regulation,7 1) which noted a major irony. Over 200 campuses
and universities had enacted hate speech or student conduct rules forbidding
hate speech, yet practically every court that considered one of them struck it
down." It seemed that the judicial system and campus administrators
operated in different universes.'
C. Campus Climate Activism

Despite (or perhaps because of) this impasse, a vigorous faction of
student activists and faculty sympathizers have recently been demanding
broad changes in the way universities operate.1 2 These "campus climate"
activists have been demanding an end to hate speech and microaggressions." They are insisting on more courses of interest to minorities as
well as more minority professors. 4 They also have been accusing colleges of
concealing their histories of complicity with slavery and naming buildings
72. UWM Post v. Regents, University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
W is. 1991).
73. See id. at 1164.
74. Id. at 1167.

75. Id. at 1166, 1169.
76.

Id. at 1176.

77. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 854-57 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
78. See Corry v. Stanford University, No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27,
1995).
79.
80.
81.

Gould, supra note 71.

Id.
See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 48 (noting the same incongruity).

82. See id. at 1919.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1920.
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after alumni with disreputable pasts. 5 The opposition includes legal
heavyweights Robert O'Neil 8 6 and Geoffrey Stone,8 7 organizations like the
ACLU 8 and FIRE," and a majority of the writers who have addressed this
subject in the pages of the Chronicle of Higher Education."o A recent
symposium issue of Minnesota Law Review included articles defending the
student position,9 1 challenging their objectives or the form in which they
present them, 92 or proposing middle-ground solutions.' Others, however,
took the position that the two approaches were essentially irreconcilable. 4

85.

Id.

86.

Robert O'Neil, Academic Freedom to Denyv the Truth: BeYond the

Holocaust, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2065 (2017). See also Vikram David Amar & Alan
E. Brownstein, A Close-up, Modern Look at First Amendment Academic Freedom

Rights oflPublic College Students and Faculty, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2017)
(noting that these rights are more severely limited than is commonly understood).
87. Law School Communications, Professor Geoffrey Stone Discusses Fee
Speech on Campus at the Amer. Law Institute, UNIV. CHI. L. SCH., (June 6, 2016),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/prof-geoffrey-stone-discusses-free-speechcampus-american-law-institute.
88. Speech
on
Campus,
AM.
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/other/speech-campus (last visited Oct. 21, 2017).
89. See What are Speech Codes?, FOUND. INDIVIDUAL R. EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/what-are-speech-codes/_(last
visited Oct. 21,

2017).
90. E.g, Susan Dodge, Campus Codes that Ban Hate Speech are Rarely Used
to
Penalize
Students,
CHRON.
HIGHER
ED.,
(Feb.
12,
1992),
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Campus-Codes-That-Ban-Hate/8 1110 (depicting
codes as passe and rarely used).
91. E.g., Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, 101 MINN. L.

REV. 1863 (2017).
92.

E.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC

Narrative, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1987, 2036-41 (2017).
93.

See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University

Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1836-39, 1857-60 (2017) (urging limitations on
universitics' abilities to censor offensive speech and promoting a policy of
condemnation and education instead).
94. See generallv Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, supra note 48, at 192441 (exploring the failure of discourse in the campus speech debate).
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D. ControllingHate-Competing Positionsand Policy Arguments
While controversy has raged on all these fronts, legal writers and
activists on both sides have been weighing in with policy reasons in favor of
or against hate speech controls. For example, many opponents of hate-speech
regulation have long argued that regulation will lead to new forms of control
and end up in a regime of official censorship.'" Others urge that the best
response to bad speech is more speech,9' or that suppressing hate speech is
unwise because allowing it serves as a pressure valve, guarding against a
more dangerous form of explosion later. Still others assert that the system
of free expression is like a seamless web and that any rent in it is unwise.9'
Yet others maintain that freedom of speech has served, historically, as
minorities' best friend, thus they, most of all, should be slow to urge its
suppression." Supporters of hate-speech regulation have countered each of
these arguments, including by noting that, however valuable free speech has
been, in the abstract, to black and Latino liberation, hate speech is not.10
E. Summing Up
With the advent of campus-climate activism and street protests carried
out in the name of the Black Lives Matter movement, the debate about state
control of hate speech and expression took on an activist turn. Not long
before, two books summed up the scholarly-analytical debate. Understanding
Words That Wound, " by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, reviewed the

95. In other words, the proverbial slippery slope. See, e.g., Fred Schauer,
Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1995). See also Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic, Hatefid Speech, Loving Communities: Why our Notion of "A Just
Balance' Changes So Slowl, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 851, 852 (1994).
96. See Richard Delgado and David Yun, The Neoconservative Case against
Hate-Speech Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove
Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1819-21 (1994) (discussing the "more speech"
argument); see also Richard Delgado, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An
Analysis ofPaternalisticObjections to Hate-Speech Regulation, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
871, 883-85 (1994).
97. See Delgado, supra note 96, at 878-80 (discussing the "pressure valve"
argument).
98. See id. at 883 (discussing the "seamless web" argument).
99. See id. at 881-83 (discussing the "best friend" argument).
100. See id. at 882-83 (countering the historical argument); Lawrence, supra
note 60, at 435 (countering the historical argument).
101. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT

WOUND 21-31, 93-150 (Westview Press 2004).
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various types of hate speech and settings in which they appeared."0 2 They
considered the careers of four special words."1 3 They also summarized policy
arguments weighing for or against legal redress for racial vituperation "0 and
concluded with a short section on the future of First Amendment legal
realism. 1 A short time later, prominent legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron
in his 2009 Holmes Lecture")' and subsequent book") put forward a powerful
argument for norms against hate speech. He points out that practically every
liberal democracy has laws against this form of utterance and that other
nations consider them essential measures to safeguard equality and
inclusion. 1" A few works on the other side respond along traditional lines,
although the scholarly and street movements currently seem to favor
restriction. Why this might be so is the subject of the final section of this
Article.
III.

A WAY FORWARD IDENTIFYING THE STAGE OF THE SOCIAL
DIALECTIC BETWEEN EQUALITY AND LIBERTY

As mentioned earlier, 1 0 we believe that the best and most defensible
way out of the current impasse is to take both sides seriously. Taking a leaf
from Laurence Tribe,110 we urge that courts, legislators, institutions, and
ordinary citizens strike the balance between the two sets of values (equal
protection and free speech) at play in the hate speech controversy in light of
current social needs. Essentially, society needs free speech values when it is
stuck. These values facilitate change, contestation, and challenges to

102. Id. at 21-31, 93-150.
103. Id. at 47-92 (discussing "nigger," "wop," "spick," "chink," and "kike").
104. Id. at 203-17.
105. Id. at 217-26. See also Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of
the First Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 778, 778-79 (2000) (reviewing another
work on legal realism).
106. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defimation: The Visibility of
Hate, 153 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1596-1657 (2010).
107. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (Harv. Univ. Press
2012).

108. Id. at Chapter 1, at 1-18 (Approaching Hate Speech); Chapter 5, at 10543 (Protecting Dignity or Protection from Offense).

109. See supra text and accompanying notes 18-19, 40-41.
110. See Laurence Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV.
269, 269 (1975).
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orthodoxy.1'' They should preponderate during times of social stasis, when
society as a whole begins to feel the need for broad systemic changes in how
we live and govern ourselves. During these times, we should allow wide
scope for challenging, even scathing speech. It behooves us, during these
times, to balance competing values in a manner that will prioritize the ones
that society most dearly needs, namely change.
At other times, however, society's foremost needs lie in the area of
protecting groups that are in need of breathing space and an opportunity to
consolidate gains. In times like these, the opposite needs assume highest
priority. Society then must tend to equal protection and human dignity. New
groups need a chance to find their places.' 2 Displaced workers need time to
adjust to a new economy.' 13 Global forces require nations to find new
relations with one another.' 14 Technology demands changes in how we
communicate, find information, relate to one another, and entertain
ourselves.' These are periods of social turmoil, strain, and upset.
As the reader might guess, we believe (I) that we are now immersed in
such a period;'"' and (2) during times such as these, equal protection values
take precedence over the social-change values associated with the First
Amendment.'" These are times of consolidation. During them, fledgling
I

just as the activist Sixties were beginning,
Mciklejohn's article illustrates the way First Amendment values can facilitate social
change.
112. For example, immigrants to settle in and find their way, minorities to
acquire an education and forn coalitions, society to come to terms with changing
norms, values, cuisines, and histories.
113. See Displaced Workers Sununarv, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, (Aug.
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (1961). Written

25, 2016).
114. Carmen Gonzalez, En vironinentalRacism, American Evceptionalism, and
Cold War Human Rights, 26 TRANSN'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 314-315
(2017).
115. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
Books
1999)
(explaining
GLOBALIZATION
(Anchor
UNDERSTANDING

globalization).
116. These times present clashing interest groups, requiring measures to
protect factional conflict and oppression.
1 17. The best-known statement in favor of these values is United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938), noting that:
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge
and experience of the legislators ... [and noting in footnote 4 that:] There
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groups are in need of protection.' 1 They need society to be predictable and
the social institutions trustworthy. They need, in short, the values of equal
protection more than those of social change and ferment.'
IV.

CONCLusioN

Efforts like Professor Brown's to define the terms in which the legal
system evaluates torts based on hateful expression exhibit a slightly defensive
quality that is perfectly understandable in times like ours. Minorities are
clamoring for recognition and defense of their rights of personhood and equal
citizenship which, in turn, is appropriate given the times. Hate crimes are
up,120 conservative forces rule,' ' immigrants are under threat,122 society
threatens religious bans on who may migrate from one country to another. 2 3
It is time to remind everyone-indeed, each other of the need to proceed
with equality and equal personhood in mind when pondering new rules and
laws. One form of that felt need for social protection for struggling groups is

may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth . . It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation . .

Nor need we

enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious . . . or national... or racial minorities,

whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. E.g., Slate Staff, Hate in America: An Updated List, SLATE (July 7, 2017).
121. E.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo'sFootnote: Multi-Group Oppressionand
a Theory of'JudicialReview, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 1, 8-18 (2017).
122. E.g., Caitlyn Dickerson, Trump Administration Targets Parents in New
Immigration Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2017.

123. See Delgado, supra note 121, at 1, 20.
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defense of group rights against hate speech. 24 That defense, in turn, generates
powerful countervailing forces emanating from the free-speech side which
point to the opposite conclusion and highlight how unwise it is to move too
far in that direction. And so the social dialectic proceeds, one libertyenforcing period followed by one of civil rights activism, and so on. We
should be careful to understand how the dialectic works and remember that
each side's values are part of the vital course of human events.
If we are to have a legal system that serves all its citizens, we must
take care to discern what is uppermost in the scale of human and societal need
at a given time. This is especially so for values, such as free speech and
equality which are sometimes opposed. Otherwise, we may fall into the
dangerous trap of succumbing to the loudest voice when, sometimes, it is the
softer one that most deserves our attention.

124. See, e.g., Lindy West, Save the First Amenchnent: Don't Let Internet
Trolls Destroy Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2017 (noting how many cultural
critics find themselves besieged by internet trolls accusing them of violating the
trolls' free speech rights, namely to engage in racist or misogynist video games and
chat groups with impunity).

